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Abstract 
After the Constitutional Court Decision No. 18/PUU-XVII/2019, fiduciary certificates no 
longer have direct executive power and the determination of promise injuries is not 
determined unilaterally by financing creditors but based on agreements between 
creditors and debtors. This certainly has an impact on fulfilling the rights of business 
actors (creditors) and ignoring binding powers on the principal financing agreement and 
fiduciary certificate. The purpose of this study is to find out whether the Constitutional 
Court Decision No. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019 is contrary to the main agreement of consumer 
financing, and How the legal strength of the consumer financing agreement after The 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019. The type of research used is a 
type of normative research with a focus on the statutory approach and the conceptual 
approach. The results of the study explained that the principal agreement of consumer 
financing with The Decree no. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019 there is a conflict (conflict) but only 
a pseudo conflict (not a textual conflict) because in terms of intent and purpose there is 
no conflict, but potentially less balance the legal interests of business actors. 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 18/PUU-XVII/2019 has destabilized the existence of 
the deed of the principal financing agreement. The minimum limit of proof of the principal 
financing agreement is not perfect and no longer binding as the law for both parties and 
the deterioration of the evidentiary value of the deed of the principal agreement and the 
legal strength of the fiduciary certificate and the principal financing agreement is in the 
determination of the court. There need to be regulations that regulate sanctions if 
consumers deliberately delay their obligations to pay credit installments and the need for 
the participation of community institutions, business actors, and including the 
government to socialize. 
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INTRODUCTION  
The competence of the Indonesian 
Constitutional Court in the field of Judicial 
Review is aimed at the testing of the Law 
against the Constitution both in terms of 
formal and in terms of material, which is 
commonly termed by testing 
constitutionalism. The basis of the 
Constitutional Court conducts 
constitutionality testing, found in Article 
24C of the 1945 NRI Constitution and 
further regulated in Article 10 of Law No. 
24 of 2003 concerning the Constitutional 
Court and its amendments to the Law. No. 
8, 2011.1 
Jimmy Asshiddiqie2 It further 
comments that theoretically, the 
existence of the Constitutional Court was 
introduced by Hans Kelsen. According to 
him, the implementation of constitutional 
rules on legislation can be effectively 
guaranteed only if an organ other than 
the legislature is given the task of testing 
whether a product of the law is 
constitutional or not, and does not 
enforce it if according to this organ the 
product of the law is unconstitutional. 
The special organ that controls it 
(the Constitutional Court) can abolish the 
entire unconstitutional law, so it cannot 
be applied by other organs. Whereas if an 
ordinary court has the competence to test 
the constitutionality of a law, it may only 
be in the form of refusing to apply it in a 
concrete case when stating that the law is 
 
1 Jurnal Konstitusi, Vol. 1, No, 1, November 2012, 
Nurul Qamar, Kewenangan Judicial Review 
Mahkamah Konstitusi, h.3 
2 Jimly Asshiddiqie,2005, Model-Model Pengujian 
Konstitusional di Berbagai Negara, Konstitusi 
Press, Jakarta 
unconstitutional while other organs are 
still required to apply it.3 
One of the Constitutional Mahkama 
Rulings that is the result of Judicial Review 
is The Decree No. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019 
which is a legal prodak born from the 
Mahkama Constitution which is the same 
degree of hierarchy as the law. The 
court's decision is an ideal legal prodak in 
the sense that it is very good in regulating 
the life of legal subjects in its position as 
legal certainty, but if applied in legal facts 
does not give birth to its problems and is 
considered less fair, because not all 
consumers understand the purpose of the 
MK Ruling.   
As proof of the holder of the 
fiduciary guarantee rights, the financing 
company will receive a fiduciary 
guarantee certificate. With this 
Certificate, creditors have the right to sell 
objects that are the object of fiduciary 
guarantees on their power if the debtor is 
injured by a promise.4 This is 
characterized by the inclusion of the 
words "FOR THE SAKE OF JUSTICE 
BASED ON THE SUPREME DIVINITY" in 
the Fiduciary Guarantee Certificate.5 
After the Decision of MK No. 18 / PUU-
XVII / 2019, the financing company is no 
longer allowed to make a direct 
withdrawal of motor vehicles. This is 
because Article 15 paragraph (2) of Law 
No. 42 of 1999 on Fiduciary Guarantee 
regulates related to the phrase "executive 
3 Arend Lijphart,1999, Patterns of Democracy 
Government Foruns and Performance in Thirty 
Six Countries, Yale University, London. 
4 Pasal 15 ayat (3) UU No. 42 Tahun 1999 
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power" and the phrase "equal to the 
court's ruling of permanent legal force" is 
considered contrary to the Indonesian 
Constitution of 1945. With the results of 
the judicial review application decision, of 
course, the financing company is not 
allowed to make a direct vehicle recall but 
must ask for the determination of the 
court first, unless the consumer 
voluntarily submits the vehicle which is 
the object of jamming that has been 
transferred fiduciary. The withdrawal of 
motor vehicles is done based on default 
on the principal agreement made by the 
financing consumer. The 
agreement/contract certainly has the 
same legal force as the law for those who 
bind themselves to the 
agreement/contract, as stipulated in 
Article 1338 paragraph (1) of the Civil 
Code. It is also known as the  Pacta Sunt 
Servanda principle. Pacta  Sunt Servanda 
principle or also called the principle of 
legal certainty. This principle relates to 
the consequences of the agreement. Pacta  
6Sunt Servanda is the principle that judges 
or third parties must respect the 
substance of contracts made by the 
parties, as is the law. They should not 
intervene in the substance of contracts 
made by the parties.  
The legal relationship between 
consumers and consumer financing 
companies is born from the principal 
agreement of consumer financing which is 
then with a fiduciary transfer of rights 
agreement which is an accessory 
 
6 Salim, 2009. Contract Law Theory and Contract 
Preparation Techniques,Sinar Grafika, Jakarta. h. 10  
agreement (follow-up). The principal 
agreement of consumer financing is 
certainly the substance of the consumer's 
obligation to make payment of 
installments of financing credit every 
month on time. And if not, then the 
consequence is a fine and does not rule out 
the possibility of ending in a vehicle recall. 
As for vehicles purchased with the 
consumer financing system and have been 
transferred in a fiduciary manner, then of 
course when consumers (debtors) default 
and the issue of fulfilling the company's 
execution rights refers to the 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 18 / 
PUU-XVII / 2019 whose position is 
equivalent to the law and does not refer to 
the principal agreement of consumer 
financing and fiduciary certificate. So that 
the fiduciary certificate is only a 
complement to administration because it 
no longer has direct executory power.  
Similarly, the phrase "promise injury" is 
considered unconstitutional if it does not 
mean that "the existence of a promising 
injury is not determined unilaterally by 
the creditor but based on an agreement 
between the creditor and the debtor or 
based on a legal effort that determines the 
existence of a promising injury". With the 
ruling, the fiduciary guarantee certificate 
will lose the same executive power as the 
court's decision that has obtained legal 
force if it does not meet the first 
requirement, there is an agreement on the 
injury of the promise (wanprestasi), and 
the two debtors voluntarily submit the 
object of the guarantee. 7Thus, the 
7 Journal of Eko Surya Prasetyo, 2020, Implications of 
The Constitutional Court Decision No. 18/PUU-
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fulfillment of the right for consumer 
financing business actors as creditors 
needs to be assessed from the principal 
agreement of consumer financing. 
Although the issues are different, it gives 
birth to a gap between the Constitutional 
Decree No. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019 and the 
main agreement of consumer financing. 
This has an impact on the fulfillment of the 
rights of business actors sourced from the 
basis of consumer financing principal 
agreements and fiduciary certificates that 
are difficult to realize under the principal 
financing agreement.  
Problem Statement 
From the background above, the 
author pulls a problem formulation, 
namely: 
1. Does the Constitutional Mahkama 
Decree No. 18/PUU-XVII/2019 be 
contrary to the principal agreement 
of consumer financing in terms of 
fulfilling the rights of financing 
businesses? 
2. What is the legal power of the 
consumer financing agreement after 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 
18/PUU-XVII/2019? 
Research Method   
The type of research that the author 
used in this study is doctrinal /normative 
legal research. For normative legal 
research that only regards secondary 
data by tracing primary legal materials, 
secondary legal materials, and tertiary 
 
Institutions,Reflections of Law, Faculty of Law, Satya 
Wacana Christian University 
 
legal materials.  The materials are 
systematically arranged, studied, then 
drawn a conclusion about the problem 
studied. The approach used is the statute 
approach and the conceptual approach. 
DISCUSSION 
1. Constitutional Court Decision No. 
18/PUU-XVII/2019 Is Contrary to 
The Principal Agreement of 
Consumer Financing in The 
Fulfillment of The Rights of 
Financing Business Actors.   
 
The agreement has binding powers 
like the law for both parties or commonly 
also called the pacta sunt servant 
principle. The legal principle is Basic and 
abstract thinking compared to the norms 
of law and the rule of law itself. As for 
legal norms according to Bruggink in the 
book entitled Repleksi About Law written 
that legal norms are basically in order, 
some are in the form of prohibitions, 
some are in the form of permits, and the 
tone is also in the form of dispensation. 
Prof. Achmad Ali's book entitled 
8Strengthening Legal Theory explained 
that the principles of law and legal norms 
can only be applied after being 
transformed into the rule of law.9 
Pacta sunt servanda is an abstract 
basic thought contained in concrete law 
or outside the rule of concrete law which 
is the basic thought of all types of legal 
engagements, including in this case 
consumer financing agreements and 
8 Bruggin, 2012. Reflections on theLaw. Aditya Bakti 
Image, Bandung, h. 100  
9 Achmad Ali. 2012. Menguat Teori Hukum dan 
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fiduciary guarantees. Financing with a 
consumer financing system is one way to 
be able to divert vehicles on a fiduciary 
basis even though the vehicle is still in 
credit. Buying a vehicle on credit with a 
consumer financing system is three legal 
subjects involved: suppliers, financing 
companies, and consumers themselves. 
The relationship of rights and obligations 
is that consumer financing companies are 
obliged to finance the purchase price of 
goods needed by consumers and pay 
them in cash to suppliers. Consumers are 
obliged to pay in installments to 
consumer financing companies, and 
suppliers are obliged to hand over goods 
to consumers.10 
Vehicles purchased by way of credit, 
the essence are not fully owned by 
consumers because they have not paid off 
their credit installments. So it is not yet 
appropriate for the vehicle to be used as 
an object of fiduciary guarantee, because 
the definition of fiduciary in Article 1 
number 1 UUJF is written that: 
"Fiduciary is the transfer of the 
property rights of an object based on 
trust on the condition that the object 
whose property rights are 
transferred remains in the possession 
of the owner of the object"11 
The phrase "transfer of property 
rights" of course the subject that is meant 
to transfer ownership rights here is the 
consumer. So logically, how can 
consumers transfer ownership rights 
 
10 Abdulkadir Muhammad and Rilda Murniati. 2000. 
Legal Aspects of Financial Institutions and Financing. 
Aditya Bakti's image. Bandung. h. 246 
11 Pasal 1 angka 1 Undang-Undang No. 42 Tahun 
1999 Tentang Jaminan Fidusia  
while consumers have not fully 100% 
own the vehicle because it has not paid off 
the installment of the motor vehicle loan. 
So ideally is a vehicle that has paid off 
100% which can be used as a fiduciary 
guarantee object. 
However, in a consumer financing 
system different from other financing 
systems, when consumers have paid the 
first installment in the consumer 
financing system, vehicle ownership has 
switched to consumers. According to 
Budi Rachmat, consumer financing is the 
ownership of goods/objects of financing 
is in consumers who are then transferred 
fiduciary to consumer financing 
companies. So that the basic guarantee is 
fiduciary in the form of goods financed by 
consumer financing companies where all 
goods ownership documents are 
controlled by consumer financing 
companies12(fiduciary transfer of 
ownership)until the last installment is 
repaid.   
The convenience offered by 
financing companies with consumer 
financing systems is not as easy as in 
efforts to fulfill their rights that must be 
obtained from the consumer. Economic 
reasons and efforts to improve the 
welfare of the community are the reasons 
for the existence of financing companies 
present in the regions.  However, 
economic reasons are also sometimes the 
cause of disputes between financing 
12 Grace. 2002. Multi Finance: Rent For Business, 
Factoring, Consumer Financing. Novindo Pustaka 
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companies and debtors (consumers) of 
financing. The birth of the dispute 
between the two parties is none other 
than because the parties both feel they 
have the right to a vehicle purchased with 
the consumer financing system itself.  
The author considers that in a 
position as a financing business actor like 
this, it is certainly not easy. Because the 
company has to face potential losses, so it 
needs good management of the company, 
careful, and apply the precautionary 
principle, both before the legal bond 
between the financing company as a 
business actor and vehicle loan debtors as 
consumers. Various consumer characters 
are certainly also the basic potential for 
disputes, so that if the employees of 
business actors do not understand the 
character or commit careless actions, 
then it can be a legal problem that is not 
only from the aspect of civil, but can cause 
criminal law problems.  
Billing and asking for information 
related to the delinquent payment of 
debtors is not an easy thing for the 
company, this is in addition to the 
character factor of the debtor, also 
because of the understanding factor if the 
debtors related to the constitutional 
court's own decision. Customers in this 
case the debtor of consumer financing are 
misguided related to the Constitutional 
Court Decision No. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019, 
they consider that if the company makes 
a withdrawal without any determination 
from the court, then it is considered an 
unlawful act and included in criminal 
cases. So that these arguments are often 
the reason for debtors not to give up 
motor vehicles that are in their control 
outside of economic reasons and this 
certainly makes it difficult for creditors if 
there must be a promise injury 
agreement.  
The decision of MK No. 18/PUU-
XVII/2019 also includes social 
engineering tools and at the same time as 
a social function. However, if consumers 
still have a mistaken understanding of 
The Constitutional Court Decision No. 18 
/ PUU-XVII / 2019, then it can be said that 
the MK Verdict does not function 
properly as a tool of social design and 
control functions. The birth of the Mk 
Ruling, none other than because the recall 
of vehicles is directly considered to 
violate the constitutional rights of 
consumers and includes seizing 
consumer vehicles. So that the vehicle 
recall must be determined by the court 
first. 
In UUJF no article regulates and 
emphasizes that consumers (debtors) are 
obliged to pay their credit insurance on 
time because it is regulated in the 
substance of the financing contract which 
is the principal agreement. While the 
Decree of Mk No. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019 
only corrects articles related to the 
problem of execution of fiduciary 
guarantee objects but does not regulate 
related to consumer obligations 
(debtors) so that there is no default and 
execution. The author stated so that there 
is strengthening for the fulfillment of the 
rights of business actors contained in the 
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In this case, it is as if there is a 
debate regarding the principal alliance 
and the fiduciary perikarya. Thus giving 
birth to legal issues, is the legal power of 
the fiduciary transfer agreement stronger 
than the principal agreement of 
consumer financing? The main 
agreement in this financing is the 
Consumer Financing Agreement, while 
the assessor agreement (its follow-up) is 
the transfer of fiduciary rights to the 
financing company. If the consumer does 
not carry out his obligations as in the 
principal agreement, whether the 
business actor is not entitled to the object 
of the fiduciary guarantee. Consequently, 
something that the tree should take 
precedence over the non-tree. Consumers 
do not carry out the obligation to pay 
installments, then of course it will soften 
their rights as consumers because the 
rights and obligations always go hand in 
hand.   
The decision of Mk No. 18/PUU-
XVII/2019 is the result of judicial review 
in Article 15 of Law No. 42 of 1999 on 
Fiduciary Guarantee whose position is 
equivalent to the law. For the basic legal 
consumer financing system is the 
presidential decree of the Republic of 
Indonesia Number 61 of 1988 concerning 
financing institutions and the Decree of 
the Minister of Finance of the Republic of 
Indonesia Number: 1251 / KMK.013 / 
1988 concerning the Provisions and 
Procedures for the Implementation of 
Financing Institutions which were later 
amended and refined by the Decree of the 
Minister of Finance No. 468 of 1995 and 
also the Civil Code. So that these four legal 
bases are the basis of business activities 
with the consumer financing system and 
also at the same time become the basis of 
the consumer financing agreement itself.  
Hierarchically, Constitutional Court 
Decision No. 18/PUU-XVII/2019 has the 
same position as the law instead of 
Jurisprudence, because the law contains 
the results of judicial review of Law No. 42 
of 1999 on Fiduciary Guarantee. Thus the 
legal basis of the consumer financing 
principal agreement has a more lace 
position compared to Mk Decree No. 18 / 
PUU-XVII / 2019. Although each 
agreement has binding powers such as 
the law as in Article 1338 paragraph (1) 
of the Civil Code or commonly also 
referred to as the pacta sund servanda 
principle, it is lexed generalis while The 
Decree of MK No. 18 /PUU-XVII /2019 is 
lexed specialis. Thus the decision of MK 
No. 18 / PUU-XVII / 2019 in addition to 
superior lex is also lexed specialized 
related to 
fiduciary problems when compared 
to the nature of the principal financing 
agreement. Thus it can be understood 
that the juridical takeoff of fiduciary 
transfer of ownership rights is stronger 
than the juridical takeoff of the principal 
consumer financing agreement. Thus, 
textually of course there is no conflict 
inverting and horizontal, but in its 
application has the potential to give birth 
to conflict, because Decree no. 18 / PUU-
XVII / 2019 does not balance the legal 
interests of business actors and tends to 
strengthen the position of consumers 
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2.  The Legal Power of Consumer 
Financing Agreement After The 
Decree of Mk No. 18/PUU-
XVII/2019 
Related to the phrase "power of law" 
of the principal agreement, the author 
divides it into 2 (two) namely First, the 
power of proof with the evidentiary value 
is perfect and binding. Second, provide 
legal protection. The truth of the content 
and the statements contained in it are 
perfect to stand alone and bind the 
parties to what is described in the deed of 
agreement and also binding to the judge 
should make it the basis of perfect facts 
and sufficient to take a verdict on the 
resolution of the disputed case. In 
addition, any agreement/contract 
document may provide legal protection 
for the rights of both parties under the 
limitations of their rights. Thus every 
deed must have the power of law both in 
terms of the power of proof and in terms 
of legal protection.  13 
In addition to legal protections born 
from the agreement, legal protection 
there are also laws and regulations and 
also the constitutional court's decision of 
judicial review results. The nature of this 
legal protection is fixed and some are 
dynamic. What is meant by the protection 
of laws that are fixed in applicable laws 
and regulations, although sometimes the 
laws and regulations change the results of 
judicial review from the Constitutional 
Court or the Supreme Court.  For the 
protection of the law that is dynamic 
 
13 M. Yahya Harahap, 2012, Civil Procedure Law,Sinar 
Grafika, Jakarta, h.545 
itself, namely in the form of efforts made 
by law enforcement itself for the 
realization of the purpose of the law itself. 
Legal problems are not only born 
because of unlawful acts or because of 
people who feel aggrieved but legal 
problems are also born from the legal 
basis that becomes the rail of legal 
certainty to achieve the legal goal itself. 
So that parties who feel aggrieved by the 
certainty of the law itself, are entitled to 
apply for judicial review. As for legal 
problems born from disputes or the 
existence of parties who feel aggrieved, 
they have the right to file a lawsuit to the 
Court. 
A dispute is essentially a rights 
dispute between the two parties. One 
party feels aggrieved by the other, while 
the other feels entitled to defend what it 
thinks is their right. In addition, efforts to 
get legal protection of what is considered 
the right of the subject of law can also be 
done by applying to the court. The 
request referred to here there are 2 (two) 
namely, First the application without 
dispute. Second, request judicial review 
against written legal grounds that are 
considered contrary to a person's 
constitutional rights. 
The author focuses on the 
protection aspects of the law with the 
efforts of judicial review application to the 
Constitutional Court of Law No. 42 of 
1999 on Fiduciary and the right for 
financing business actors to obtain legal 
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Constitutional Court Decision No. 18/ 
PUU-XVII / 2019. Of course, the 
Constitutional Court before deciding the 
application for judicial review of Law No. 
42 of 1999 on Fiduciary Guarantee must 
consider legal protection between both 
parties, not just the applicant's legal 
protection. So that the MK verdict is a 
scientific verdict from the aspect of legal 
science. 
The constitutional court's decision 
is a final and binding ruling, but not 
immune from criticism and suggestions 
from the academic aspect. Thus there is 
still a wide-open opportunity to test it 
academically. This is none other than 
because every decision of the judiciary 
must be able to provide the spirit of 
justice for both parties, although it is not 
the same scale because the demands of 
justice do not always have to be the same. 
The Constitutional Court's decision 
No. 18/PUU-XVII/2019, has received 
criticism in essence that the 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 
18/PUU-XVII/2019 is considered to be 
less than balanced by the rights of 
financing businesses. This is none other 
than because the financing business is no 
longer allowed to carry out executions 
directly(para te execution), but must be 
through an application from the district 
court, so that the legal power of the 
Fiduciary Guarantee Certificate is no 
longer equivalent to a court ruling with 
permanent legal force.  
In addition, provisions related to the 
time of appointment injury must be met 
and agreed upon in advance with the 
consumer. So that it is not necessarily 
when the consumer is in arrears, the 
company has the right to carry out 
executions directly. Although in practice 
it is not like that done by the company. In 
addition, the process of withdrawal and 
execution becomes longer and also 
convoluted. Fundamental differences 
related to the problem of execution of 
fiduciary guarantee objects. 
Looking at the comparison of Law 
No. 42 of 1999 on Fiduciary Guarantee 
with Constitutional Court Decision  No. 18 
/ PUU-XVII / 2019 is the most basic issue 
of execution. In essence, the financing 
business can no longer make withdrawals 
directly and the time to be able to be 
cpakpak promised injury must be an 
agreement first.  
Researchers assess that 
Constitutional Court Decision  No. 
18/PUU-XVII/2019 is part of the renewal 
of civil law, namely the fiduciary 
guarantee law. One of the rights of 
property is the right to guarantee objects. 
One type of legal engagement in the law of 
guarantee is the fiduciary Damian. 
Fiduciary guarantee engagement is the 
accessory  (follow)'s Pelikan from the 
principal engagement. In the sense of the 
alliance, the tree can stand without the 
accessory perikarya. So there will be no 
access alliance if there is no principal 
engagement. In the legal contract of 
motor vehicle financing, the consumer 
financing contract is the principal 
engagement, while the transfer of 
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The withdrawal of motor vehicles 
that are in the control of the debtor 
(consumer), and the end the debtor 
objects and sues and arrives at the 
judicial process and won by the 
consumer.  This happens to the consumer 
financing business actors who make 
withdrawals without any determination 
from the court first and voluntary 
submission from the debtor.  
The above picture is an impact of the 
Constitutional Court Decision  No. 18 / 
PUU-XVII / 2019 for consumer financing 
business actors if they make withdrawals 
without a determination from the court. 
The judge's ruling that wins the debtor 
(consumer) is not a wrong thing. Because 
it is basically by the provisions of the 
applicable law in this case the MK Verdict.  
On the other hand, it is necessary to 
consider the aspect of justice for 
financing business actors and the aspect 
of usefulness in the world of consumer 
financing business. The consideration is 
that consumers are considered to have 
broken the promise that installments are 
not paid 3 times for example, and it is a 
violation of the promise on the main 
agreement that is a consumer financing 
agreement, while the business actor in 
making vehicle recalls, first there must be 
a determination from the court, if making 
a vehicle recall without any 
determination from the court, then it is 
considered an unlawful act. 
The existence or not of the 
determination of the court owned by 
consumer financing business actors is not 
a fair benchmark or not the actions of 
business actors in the introduction of 
vehicles. The absence of court 
determination owned by business actors 
in making vehicle recalls does not mean 
that the act is an unfair thing. Because the 
rights of business actors are in the 
principal engagement of consumer 
financing agreements and fiduciary 
transfer of property rights and fiduciary 
certificates. 
The author concluded that 
Constitutional Court Decision No. 
18/PUU-XVII/2019 has destabilized the 
existence of the deed of the principal 
financing agreement. So that the 
minimum limit of proof of the principal 
financing agreement is not perfect and no 
longer binding as a law for both parties 
and cannot provide strong legal 
protection for the fulfillment of the rights 
of business actors because of the decline 
in the evidentiary value of the basic 
agreement deed without having to be a 
proof of resistance submitted by 
consumers. In other words, the legal 
power of the fiduciary certificate and the 
deed of the principal financing agreement 
is in the determination of the court. 
CONCLUSION 
 Based on the results of the 
discussion above, it can be concluded 
that: 
 The principal agreement of 
consumer financing with Decree No. 
18/PUU-XVII/2019 there is a conflict 
(conflict) but only a pseudo conflict (not a 
textual conflict) because in terms of 
intent and purpose there is no conflict. 
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/ PUU-XVII / 2019 has the potential to 
reduce the legal interests of business 
actors and fiduciary transfer of property 
rights agreements more inclined to 
strengthen the position of consumers 
who wanprestasi (broken promises). 
 Constitutional Court Decision No. 
18/PUU-XVII/2019 has destabilized the 
existence of the deed of the principal 
financing agreement. So that the 
minimum limit of proof of the principal 
financing agreement is not perfect and no 
longer binding as a law for both parties 
and cannot provide strong legal 
protection for the fulfillment of the rights 
of business actors because of the decline 
in the evidentiary value of the basic 
agreement deed without having to be a 
proof of resistance submitted by 
consumers. In other words, the legal 
power of the fiduciary certificate and the 
principal financing agreement is in the 
determination of the court. 
SUGGESTION 
The researcher's advice after the 
discussion is as follows: 
There need to be regulations that 
regulate sanctions if consumers 
deliberately delay their obligations to pay 
credit installments when on the other 
hand consumers can afford to pay credit 
installments.  
To increase public understanding 
related to consumer financing issues, it is 
necessary to participate in community 
institutions, business actors, and 
including the government to socialize 
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